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SPEECH
POLICE CORRUPTION AND
THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP*
PATRICK V. MURPHY**

The dramatic revelations of the Mollen Commission,' and the
attendant news media coverage of corruption, brutality, and other serious
misconduct,2 as well as the failures of internal controls, could leave
several impressions: that police corruption is inevitable, that reforms
cannot be institutionalized, and that the same serious failures return every
* Mr. Murphy delivered these remarks at a symposium sponsored by the New York
Law School Law Review in conjunction with the New York Law School Center for New
York City Law on March 30, 1995 entitled Police Corruption, Municipal Corruption:
Cures at What Costs?
**
Director, Police Policy Board, United States Conference of Mayors,
Washington, D.C.
1. The Mollen Commission, created by Mayor David N. Dinkins on July 24, 1992,
was a twenty-two month investigation into the corruption of the New York City Police
Department. The investigation also evaluated the Police Department's procedures in
preventing and detecting corruption, and recommended changes to maximize the
prevention of corruption.

N.Y. CITY COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF

POLICE CORRiPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROC. OF TE POLICE DEP'T,
CO VM'N
REP., at 1-109 (July 7, 1994) (Milton Mollen, Chair) [hereinafter MOLLEN
COMM'N REP.].
2. See, e.g., Rick Bragg, Blue Wall of Silence: Graft Shielded Behind Old Code,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1994, at Bi; George James, Sergeant Charged in Police
Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at B3; Clifford Krauss, Five Brooklyn
Officers Suspected of Drug Shakedowns, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 1994, at B3; Clifford
Krauss, FourteenMore Officers Arrested at a Shaken 30th Precinct,N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 1994, at Al; Clifford Krauss, More Officers Caught in Stings, Police Say, N.Y.
TIhms, July 6, 1994, at B2; Clifford Krauss, Three Officers Held in Police Sting After
Robbery is Videotaped, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1994, at Al; Clifford Krauss, Two Year
CorruptionInquiry Findsa 'Willful Blindness' in New York's Police Dept., N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 1994, at Al; Joe Sexton, New York Police Often Lie Under Oath, Report Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at Al.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

twenty years.' That would be unfortunate. It could result in unwarranted
cynicism. Rather, the facts support quite different conclusions.
The cycle has not been one of a recurring problem. Instead, it has

been evolutionary. Police corruption of any dimension is a grave matter.
Professor Egon Bittner of Brandeis University has described policing as

a vocation of service to the poor.'

But unfortunately, because corrupt

officers usually exploit the weakest among us-those whom they are sworn

to protect-they thus deprive the weakest among us of their participation
as full members of a government for the people. However, the gravity of
corruption, both in extent and consequence, has generally been declining
in the past cehturyi
As a police captain, I was assigned by a very able, dedicated
Commissioner to develop the Department's first performance evaluation

system for captains and higher ranking officers; sometimes referred to as
the Executive Corps. After lunch one day, I was summoned to the office
of the four-star chief, then called the chief inspector, to review the names

and ratings of those recommended for promotion to the inspector and chief
ranks. The process involved some mathematics, which began to test the
chief's patience. As the afternoon wore on, he paused and said, "it must
have been a lot easier to do this when city hall told you who to promote."
What he meant by that statement was that when Mayor Robert Wagner 6
3. Investigations of corruption in the New York City Police Department have taken
place roughly every twenty years since 1895. See REP. AND PRoC. OF THE SENATE
COMM. APPOINTED TO INvEsTIGATE THE POLICE DEP'T OF THE CITY OF N.Y. AS
TRANsMITTED TO THE LEoISLATURE (Jan. 18, 1895) (Senator Clarence Lexow, Chair)

[hereinafter LEXOW COMM'N REP.]; REP. OF THE SPECIAL COMM. OF THE BD. OF
ALDERMEN OF THE CrrY OF N.Y. TO INVESTIGATE THE POLICE DEP'T (June 10, 1933)
(Henry H. Curran, Chair); FINAL REP. OF SAMUEL SEABURY, REFEREE, IN THE
MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MAGISTRATE'S CTS. IN THE ]FIRST JUD. DEP'T
AND THE MAGISTRATES THEREOF, AND OF ATTORNEY'S-AT-LAW PRACTICING IN SAID
CTS. (March 28, 1932) (Samuel Seabury, Referee); INVESTIGATION OF ORGANIZED
CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1951: HEARINGS BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE SPECIAL
COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1951) (Senator

Estes Kefauver, Chair) (testimony of Miles F. McDonald, Dist. Att'y, Kings County,
N.Y., and Julius Helfand, Ass't Dist. Att'y, Kings County, N.Y.); REP. TO INVESTIGATE
ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE CITY'S ANTI-CORRUPTION PROC. (Dec.
26, 1972) (Whitman Knapp, Chair) [hereinafter KNAPP COMM'N REP.]; MOLLEN

COMM'N REP., supra note 1.

4. See Egon Bittner, Emerging Police Issues, in Loc. GOV'T POLICE MGMT. 1, 9
(Bernard L. Garmine, ed., Int'l City Mgmt. Ass'n, 2d ed. 1982) (stating that police
direct their attention to problems which are most often part of the lives of the poor).
5. See id. at 53 (explaining that police corruption is less common today than in the
past).
6. Mayor of the city of New York from 1954-1965.
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came into office in 1954, he gave the authority to his commissioners,
which former mayors had often exercised themselves, to promote or
demote above the civil service rank of captain. 7 In my opinion, Mayor
Wagner thus empowered the commissioners, then and since, in a great
leap forward to control the Department. Using that power vigorously
enables a commissioner to have a great impact on integrity, performance,
and morale, as well as the ability to remove a level of potential corruption
in the form of political favoritism.
Mayor Wagner's policy was a major turning point in the history of the
Department's ability to bring corruption under control. He implemented
the most fundamental change to permit a transition from systemic
corruption to systemic integrity. Promotions above captain changed from
politically-based to merit-based.8 Unfortunately, systemic corruption did
not decline as a result of this alteration in the command structure. 9
Management simply lacked the ability to know how to stop the longestablished systems of corruption. It was not until a reform administration
at the time of the Knapp Commission l that a head-on attack against
systemic corruption finally began to dismantle the long established systems
of corruption.n
Previously, many people who reached the civil service rank of captain
sought improper political influence to obtain promotion, in all but a few
units." Organized corruption in the patrol division's gambling units was
7. See PATRICK V. MURPHY & THOMAS PLATE, COMMISSIONER: A VIEW FROM
oF AmmcAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 152 (1977) (explaining that Mayor Wagner

THE Top

gave the Police Commissioners a "free hand" in running the Police Department); see also
Richard Reeves, Mayor Claims Role Over Setting Policy in Police Matters, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 1967, at AS (stating that Mayor Wagner allowed Police Commissioner Adams
to run assignments and promotions within the Police Department free from any influence
from City Hall).
8. See Influence is Out, Police Cautioned, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1955, at 62 (stating
that police promotions would be based on merit and not influenced by politics); see also
Adams Urges Ban on Police Politics, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 1955, at 29 (noting Mayor
Wagner's policy of not interfering with the Police Department).
9. See MURPHY & PLATE, supra note 7, at 153; see also Gerald Caplan & Patrick
V. Murphy, FosteringIntegrity, in Loc. GoV'T POLICE MGMT. 241 (William A. Geller
ed., 3rd ed. 1991) [hereinafter FosteringIntegrity].
10. KNAPP COhMM'N REP., supra note 3, at 1-244.
11. See M.A. Farber, Decade After Knapp Inquiry, a Sense of 'Revolution'
Pervades Police Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1982, at B1, B5 (finding that, since the
Knapp Commission, there has been a profound changein the Police Department's attitude
toward corruption-not only in senior police officials, but in officers on the streets).
12. See Bittner, supra note 4, at 53 (explaining that today fewer police officers are
hired or promoted as result of political payoffs or outright payoffs).
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lucrative.' 3 Sergeants' clubs in the precincts that collected street level
gambling and liquor graft created a climate of corruption.' 4 I have been
told that detective assignments were politically influenced at that time, and
apparently at one point, you could buy such an assignment right in the
office of the chief of detectives. Because of this, many able, dedicated
captains never sought promotions that depended on political support.
Mayor Wagner's change worked fundamental improvements in
The ability to reward good work with
combatting corruption. '1
high-level promotion enables a commissioner to motivate managers to
raise standards of integrity. A commissioner's power to demote to captain
motivates commanders to detect wrongdoing and to discipline offenders.
However, this occurs only when a commissioner actually exercises the
power.
Unfortunately, some fine commissioners, while diligently
depoliticizing the Executive Corps by attrition, did not hold commanders
accountable for the continuing prosperity of plainclothes pads16 and
precinct sergeants' clubs. Therefore, while in theory the change was a
positive step, in application it had less than optimal results." 7 This
example of one way to combat corruption, and its lack of complete
effectiveness, shows well the inherent difficulties with municipal
management and of police departments in particular.
Administrating a Police Department of more than 30,000 officers is
a complex task and the problems of organization and management are
enormous. Police administration could well be the most difficult and
complex discipline within public administration. Outside oversight can
indeed be helpful for these administrators. For example, the Mollen
Commission has made a very valuable contribution to the problem of
restoring the integrity of the Department and putting in place those devices
that are necessary to maintain that integrity in the future."
Community policing is one very important way of maintaining the
integrity of the Police Department and preventing misconduct. It gives the
people a role in protecting the community while establishing a very
powerful relationship between the people and the police at the lowest level
13. KNAPP COMM'N

REP.,

supra note 3, at 71.

14. Id.
15. See MuRPHY & PLATE, supranote 7, at 153 (stating that there were no serious
police corruption scandals under Mayor Wagner due in part to his reform policies).
16. KNAPP COMM'N REP., supra note 3, at 74 (explaining a system where
plainclothes officers would collect regular payoffs from gamblers within their precinct
or division).
17. MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 1, at 77-79.
18. See Michael Gorman Whitestone, Power to the Cop Monitor, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Oct. 29, 1994, at A18 (supporting the idea of an outside monitoring agency).
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of operations. In my opinion, community policing, done properly, would
be one of the best possible oversight mechanisms you could have for the
Police Department.
In 1990, Commissioner Lee Brown19 established experiments in the
precincts at Canarsie ° and Mill Basin,2 1 called "Cop of the Block."'
I will take a minute to describe that concept because I believe in it so
much. It has been tried in this Department three or four other times.
The Cop of the Block program takes the officers assigned to a
particular sector on a permanent basis (a sector is an area of about 10,000
people which has two officers in a typical patrol car) and divides the
sector into eight or ten parts, so that each officer has an area of his own,
a subsector, if you will, consisting of one or two blocks depending on
population density.' The officer can then relate very closely with the
people living in that area.
A number of departments around the country are experimenting with
similar community policing programs.' Indeed, numerous departments
are moving quite far ahead with the use of "resident police officers,"
where an officer will be offered a rent-free apartment in a public housing
project and can live in the community.'
Of course, community policing is not the whole answer; there are
other key actors in this process. Many elements have to be in place and,
in particular, community relations have to be established for things to

work out. If any one of these elements is not in place, it can be a
problem.

Obviously, the Mayor is a key actor. We must ask: Does the Mayor
make integrity in the Police Department the highest priority? Mayors
19. Lee Brown was New York City Police Commissioner from Jan. 22, 1990, to

Sept. 1, 1992.
20. New York City Police Department, 69th Precinct, Brooklyn, N.Y.
21. New York City Police Department, 63rd Precinct, Brooklyn, N.Y.
22. See Edmund Stubbing, Don't Scrap the Squad Car, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 20,
1990, at 58; see also Pamela Newkirk, Police Announce Plan to Help Ease Crown
Heights' Tensions, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 11, 1991, at 26 (describing programs where
officers are assigned to smaller sections of the community to police on foot, thus
promoting closer police/community involvement).
23. See Stubbing, supranote 22 (describing the method for dividing the community
among police officers).
24. See Eric Harrison, Community-Based Policing Takes on New Meaning, L.A.
TINEs, Nov. 17, 1993, at AS; see also Kim Cobb, Police Homestead Idea Sparks
Interest, HoUsTON CHRON., Dec. 19, 1993, at Al (noting that police departments across
the country give similar community policing programs various titles, such as, "resident
police program" and "police homestead program").
25. See Harrison, supra note 24, at AS; see also Cobb, supra note 24, at Al.
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have great pressures; as elected officials, they are involved in the political
process every day. But do they say to the Commissioner: "Integrity in the
Police Department is my highest priority and I will support you in every
way to assure that it happens"?
I think that between the two ideas-one being that Commissioner
Scoppetta" work for Mayor Giuliani directly, and the second being what
the Mollen Commission proposed-frankly, I can see advantages and
disadvantages in both. My own view is to hold the Mayor as fully
accountable as possible. And under the arrangement with Commissioner
Scoppetta, I think the Mayor is holding himself more fully accountable
than he would with any other kind of an oversight body.
As for a permanent, ongoing panel to oversee corruption in the Police
Department, I certainly understand, as both sides on this issue understand,
that, with the current situation in New York City, and what has been
revealed by the Mollen Commission, there is a very strong feeling that
some kind of outside entity is necessary.' And I accept that; in fact, it's
almost a political necessity right now.
What I would like to focus in on for a few minutes-as we read in the
report about the culture of the Police Department-is the culture itself.
I prefer to look at the culture of the Executive Corps, because it is not
as well understood. The Executive Corps consists of about 150 people,'
maybe a few more, who have achieved the civil service rank of captain
and now serve in higher ranks: deputy inspectors, inspectors, deputy
chiefs, assistant chiefs, three-star and four-star chiefs. They are the
people who run the Department.
Obviously the Police Commissioner cannot run the Department alone.
He depends on the people in the Corps. They are critical and can make
26. Nicholas Scoppetta, appointed by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani on February 28,
1995, to chair the Mayor's Commission to Combat Police Corruption.
27. The Mollen Commission's primary recommendation was for the formation of
a "permanent, independent oversight body." However, the Commission Report also
proposed:
improving screening and recruitment; improving recruit education and inservice integrity training; strengthening first-line supervision; reinventing the
enforcement of command accountability; attacking corruption and brutality
tolerance; challenging other aspects of police culture and conditions that breed
corruption and brutality; strengthening intelligence-gathering efforts;
preventing and detecting drug abuse; soliciting police union support for anticorruption efforts; minimizing the corruption hazards of community policing;
and legislative reforms.
MOLLEN CoMM'N REP., supra note 1, at 7.
28. See Don't Veto the Police Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994, at 18; see
also Thomas D. Thatcher II, How to Police the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at
A15.
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things happen. I am convinced that they can prevent corruption and be
more effective in dealing with crime if they understand what is expected
of them; if the Commissioner holds them accountable and gives them the
means to prevent corruption.
Certainly, a commissioner does not want to be ruthless. None of us
want to be cruel to the people we have worked with, with whom we went
through the academy. But when one accepts the position of commissioner,
that person's obligation is first to the people, then to the Department, and
then to those great officers who go out on the street every night and day
and risk their lives. I don't mean to be dramatic about it, but in 1971, I
buried eleven officers killed by gunfire.
So the commissioner's loyalty to the "brass" of the Department should
be very strong, but a commissioner is wise to put the "brass" in
competition with one another-to tell the officers that, while they cannot
all be made chiefs, they can compete and whoever can do the best job in
reducing corruption in his area will be the one to get the prize.
Thus, while looking at the make up the Executive Corps is important,
there are many other issues that remain. For most of the century the
cause of police corruption was improper political interference in the
Department.' But as it ended, corruption did not. Good management
and strong leadership had virtually eliminated corruption for fifteen years.
Weak leadership and poor management resulted in the return of
corruption, but on a much smaller scale.' Less than ten percent of the
precincts were affected, as compared to a much larger number before the
1970 reform. 1
But, again, attempting to find the cause in a "conspiracy of silence"
or a "culture of corruption" overlooks the reality of a culture of integrity
when a commissioner believes in the honesty of a vast majority of officers
29. See IN THE MATrER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DEP'Ts OF THE GOV'T OF
THE CrrY OF N.Y.: INTEnEDIATE REP. (Hon. Samuel Seabury, Counsel) (Jan. 25,
1932); LExow COMM'N REP., supra note 3.
30. See Carlyle C. Douglas & Mary Connelly, Rattling the Brass in Brooklyn's
77th, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 2, 1986, at D6; see also Leonard Buder, Grand Jury Hears
Evidence on Suspended Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1986, at A28 (referring to the
1986 eruption of a corruption scandal involving 13 officers from the 77th
Precinct-approximately 15 years after the commencement of the Knapp Commission
investigation in 1970).
31. Compare MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 1, at 11-14 (focusing on the
corruption scandals in six out of the seventy-five New York City police precincts; noting,
however, that the Commission is not able to produce a scientifically precise estimate of
the extent of the corruption) with KNAPP COMM'N RFP., supranote 3, at 1-5 (concluding
that police corruption is widespread, based on information supplied by hundreds of
sources within and without the Department, which information was consistent with the
specific instances of corruption that the Commission was able to investigate).
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and requires open and honest leadership at every level. When officers
experience fairness and high standards, they gladly advise their
supervisors confidentially of misconduct. Sergeants who are positive
leaders relate well to their subordinates. In turn, those subordinates
protect the sergeant from becoming the victim of a bad subordinate by
informing him or her of any indication of corruption, brutality, or other
significant lapses in integrity. The "blue wall" 32 exists only when
management surrenders to the very small percentage of criminals who slip
through the elaborate screening process that selects only men and women
who have lived exemplary lives for their first twenty or more years. An
administrator who identifies a "culture of corruption" or a "conspiracy of
silence" as the underlying cause of corruption is really admitting his own
failure to prevent those problems through good management and strong
leadership. Those failures expose tens of thousands of dedicated officers
to the shame of having their department disgraced. Rather than empower
the good people to participate in maintaining integrity, they are deprived
of the opportunity by passively permitting criminals in uniform to operate
as drug traffickers, shakedown artists, and brutal cops.
Preventing corruption is a complex problem in a large department;
one that deserves significant research, debate, and attention. The Mollen
Commission has done a fine job, but what we really need to ensure is
leadership from the top in the area of integrity.

32. See Fostering Integrity, supra note 9, at 251 (noting the widespread
unwillingness of officers to report misconduct of fellow officers, based on the pressure
to conform and the officers' reliance on one another).

